1	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT		
2	IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE		
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4	W.R. GRACE & CO., et al., : CHAPTER 11 Debtors : Case No. 01-01139 (JJF)		
5	: Jointly Administered		
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7	Wilmington, Delaware Monday, November 5, 2001		
8	4:33 o'clock, p.m.		
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10	BEFORE: HONORABLE RODERICK R. MCKELVIE, U.S.D.C.J.		
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12	APPEARANCES:		
13	PACHULSKI, STANG, ZIEHL, YOUNG & JONES BY: DAVID W. CARICKHOFF, JR., ESQ.		
14	-and-		
15	KIRKLAND & ELLIS		
16	BY: JAMES W. KAPP, III, ESQ. and SAMUEL A. SCHWARTZ, ESQ.		
17	(Chicago, Illinois)		
18	Counsel for Debtors		
19	PHILLIPS, GOLDMAN & SPENCE, P.A.		
20	BY: JOHN C. PHILLIPS, JR., ESQ.		
21	Counsel for Former Officers, P/3		
22			
23			
24	Valerie J. Gunning Official Court Reporter		
25	VIIIVILI COULD INSPOLECT		



1	APPEARANCES	(Continued):
2		CAMPBELL & LEVINE BY: MATTHEW ZALESKI, ESQ.
3		-and-
4		
5		CAPLIN & DRYSDALE BY: PETER LOCKWOOD, ESQ. (Washington, D.C.)
6		-and-
7		
8		BILZIN & SUNBERG, SCOTT L. BAENA, ESQ.
9		Counsel for Official Committee of Asbestos Property Damage Claimants
LO		
11	, .	STROOCK AND STROOCK AND LAVAN
L2		BY: KENNETH PASQUALE, ESQ.
.3		(New York, New York)
4		Counsel for Committe of Unsecured Creditors
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Jack?

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PROCEEDINGS

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(Proceedings commenced in the courtroom beginning at 4:33 p.m)

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THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody.

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MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, Jack Phillips on behalf of four former plaintiffs -- excuse me -- four former officers and directors, the plaintiffs in this case.

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This is the time set for the motion of those four former officers and directors for indemnification, your Honor.

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We filed our motion. There has been a response by the Committee for the asbestos personal injury claimants, a response by the Unsecured Creditors Committee, and a response by counsel for the debtors.

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THE COURT: All right.

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straightforward matter, in my opinion. These are former officers, directors and agents of the debtor, but it goes

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down to, I mean, Ryan is nothing more than a mid-level

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person. He was the assistant comptroller. All four of these

MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, this is a pretty

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people claim to have indemnification rights under the

by-laws, the by-law of the debtor corporation.

The by-law is cited to your Honor in papers.

All four of these people have, in addition to that,

contractual letters of indemnification from the

corporation. And but for the fact that an appeal was

taken of these SEC proceedings, this matter probably would

have been over and done with and these people would have been

paid and indemnified, but the appeal put everything on hold

and this filing has occurred.

But the fact is, your Honor, this is nothing more than a strategic filing. The intent of this filing by this debtor is to create a trust mechanism for paying asbestos claims. I don't think it's a great secret. At the end of the day, all the creditors are going to get 100 cents on the dollar. At the end of the day, the asbestos plaintiffs are going to get paid under the trust in accordance with the trust provision. Providing the identification requested by these four individuals will not adversely affect either of those two groups of people.

The corporation itself was subject to this investigation. The corporation itself took care of itself. The corporation has depleted the only insurance policy that would have been available to these people. So now when we go ask for our insurance coverage, they say the policy is -- has been used up.

And I suggest to your Honor that this is a matter of equity that this Court has jurisdiction over.

These four -- well, at least three of these four people will not be able to afford to defend themselves without this indemnification.

These people are caught in a situation where the accounting method at issue was reviewed and approved by the Corporations Audit Committee and by the corporations outside auditors. It was not an issue until the SEC changed its rules.

And although these are serious allegations, they are nothing more than allegations. These are not allegations that have generated any shareholder derivative actions. It is -- whenever this conduct was, it did not hurt the corporation. It did not take money out of the corporation's pocket.

Now, there's an argument to be made here, your Honor, that the first-day motions, the employee benefit motion, and perhaps thereafter the ordinary course motion could allow this Court to order these indemnification payments. Certainly, the Court's equitable power under Section 105 would allow the Court to grant this motion, and I suggest to your Honor that equity demands that this Court do so.

I would also suggest, your Honor, that not doing

so would be detrimental to the estate. It would certainly have negative publicity at a very sensitive time in this debtors' reorganization process. But much more importantly, I don't think it is -- I don't think there's any doubt, your Honor, that this would cause debtors' current officers, directors and managers serious concern at a time when it is already difficult for a debtor to retain those people due to the bankruptcy filing.

It would be detrimental to their morale and the debtors' ability to retain these people. Thus, I think it could be construed as a matter of necessity that the Court do this in order to protect that morale and the retention efforts. And I would suggest to your Honor that the Debtors Committee -- excuse me -- the debtors actually support this motion and, as a consequence, I believe the Court should grant this motion.

THE COURT: All right. Who else wants to speak today?

MR. PASQUALE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Ken Pasquale for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

I think we'd agree that this is a straightforward matter. However, it's straightforward because the law that governs this motion compels the result, which is that the motion should be denied.

The by-laws and the letter indemnification

agreements were all entered into prepetition. The acts that are involved are all prepetition. None of the former employees were employed at any time near the petition date, and certainly not post-petition.

These are prepetition, general unsecured claims.

And we've cited the cases in our pleading to the Court in this circuit that provide that indemnification requests like this are prepetition claims, not entitled to any priority treatment, which is exactly what's being asked for here:

Priority treatment.

Nor is this a matter where Section 105 and the equities should be applied.

The cases in this circuit, the Lehigh case that we've cited, under the necessity doctrine, payment has to be necessary to facilitate the continued operation of the debtor. We don't have any of that here. This is not the type of situation where we have a trade, a vital trade creditor, for example, that can impose what's — an economic sanction upon the debtor. These are former employees looking for indemnification payments.

There is a heavy burden upon the movants in the situation, in any event. And I think looking at the papers and what has been presented today, the movants haven't met that burden. We hear words, but they certainly can't meet the burden of an economic impact upon the debtors

post-petition in the reorganization process.

Finally, let me just say, with respect to the first-day orders, the debtors, in their own submission to this Court on this motion, have admitted that, first, the ordinary course motion was denied, so there's no relief to be gained there.

With respect to the employee benefits motion, the debtors admit that that motion was not intended to cover these former employees and these requests for indemnification.

And, indeed, the Committee objected to the employee benefit motion with respect to payments to former employees, and certainly had that motion pertained to these former employees, we would have objected there as well.

But I think the most important factor there is that the debtors say, and they admit that it was not their intention to cover these employees by those motions. And, certainly, the orders that were entered are totally silent as to it.

Finally, with respect to the debtors' papers to this Court on this motion, the debtors say, Well, it's okay with us because we have the money. Well, I think all of the creditors in my constituency, the banks and the trade, they'd love to get paid now, too. But that's not what the bankruptcy laws provide. And this is no different. There's

simply no legal justification to grant this motion.

Finally, with respect to the impact that this could have on the debtors, it has been seven months since the debtors filed the petition. I think by now, the employees, current employees, especially in light of the first-day orders, they now have more of an understanding of what this process will mean to them.

And, frankly, denying this motion will have no impact, it seems to me, to any of those employees. We're talking about four people in the scope of the larger first-day orders that were entered by the Court to protect employees.

So we submit that the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PASQUALE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Anyone else?

MR. LOCKWOOD: Good evening, your Honor. No. It is still afternoon. Peter Lockwood from Caplin Drysdale for the Asbestos Claimants Committee.

I would just like to respond to a couple of points made by counsel for the movants here. The -- with all due respect, the assertion that this is sort of a trivial exercise because there's not a lot of money and this is just a strategic filing and we're going to put money in a trust, everything is going to be paid off a hundred cents on the

dollar that was made at the beginning of the argument there, there's an expression I believe called his mouth to God's ear.

I think, suffice it to say that while it is devoutly to be hoped that that might be the outcome here, there is certainly nothing in the record to date that would support the substantial likelihood of such an outcome, and I would submit that this Court could not possibly, absent the creation of some sort of record on the point, simply take counsel's naked assertion that such a result was likely to be forthcoming as a basis for granting a motion of this sort.

And, indeed, I think the absence of a record is of some significance here, because there are a number of other assertions that have been made here that conceivably, had they been the subject of evidence, the Court might be entitled to take them into consideration.

For example, the assertion that there would be negative publicity to the company that would be in some sense meaningful is just an assertion. There's no showing of that. The papers do indicate that the corporation, as we pointed out in our opposition, was, in fact, sued because of the acts of the — with which the SEC also charged the individual plaintiffs here. The corporation settled that case many years ago.

We don't -- they assert that their acts didn't cause any harm to the corporation. It didn't cost it any money. Well, we don't have the record of whose responsibility it was or what the terms of the settlement were or how much legal fees the corporation had to pay in order to arrive at the settlement that it did, but, again, the notion that we could just toss out hear the proposition that, Oh, gee, the corporation never got heard, and that's another reason why equity should suggest that these amounts should be paid.

As Mr. Pasquale pointed out, these are indisputedly prepetition claims that are at issue here, and the only bankruptcy principle that would, or there may be two bankruptcy principles that might, under a proper showing, take prepetitions and allow them to be -- prepetition obligations and allow them to be paid post-petition.

One is the necessity doctrine, which Mr. Pasquale averted to. The necessity doctrine, because it allows a debtor to prefer certain types of prepetition claims over all other types of prepetition claims, by paying them currently, is a very, very narrowly limited doctrine, and it is predicated on the proposition that the relationships between the debtor and the creditors whose claims are being paid are so important to the continued financial success of the debtor during the reorganization process post-petition, that it is

in the interests of the debtor and all of its existing creditors that those claims be paid so that those relationships can be preserved.

There is no relationship between this debtor and these creditors to preserve, and the doctrine of necessity is accordingly wholly inapplicable under these circumstances.

The only other suggestion of any kind of continuing impact on the debtor is the supposition that somehow or another, because these former officers have indemnity claims that might not get paid, that would make the current officers afraid that if they had indemnity claims in the future, they might not get paid.

Well, among other things, there would certainly be at least the substantial possibility that if there were actions that could successfully be asserted against present management post-petition, that those actions would not be prepetition claims, if indemnification was sought. Even if you could argue that the right to indemnify was a prepetition origin, because it was based, say, on the by-laws that existed prepetition, the fact would remain that the current officers could, in fact, come in here and make an argument under the doctrine of necessity that they were necessary to the corporate reorganization and that their being unable to defend themselves would somehow or another hurt this

corporation as it exists today in this reorganization and in its present business, an argument which is wholly inapplicable and unavailable to former officers.

So there's just no -- there's no equity and no legal basis for the Court to do here what these debtors -- what these movants would ask it to do.

Their final resort is, Gee, Judge, we're really going to be in tough shape financially if we don't get indemnified.

I will accept counsel's naked assertion of that as truthful. But the fact is that I represent a lot of people, some of whom are dying from mesothelioma, or lung cancer, and they're not going to get paid anything on their prepetition obligations while this case is going on. And for the life of me, I would have a tough time explaining to them and their families why their needs are any less entitled to special attention from this Court than the financial needs of somebody whose prepetition conduct has gotten it embroiled in litigation with the SEC, litigation which, I might add, presumably they could have settled just like the company did many years ago, and this would not be before us today.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anybody else?

MR. KAPP: Good afternoon, your Honor. James Kapp on behalf of the debtors.

obligations currently.

I thought I might say a few words. I've heard a lot of talk about what the debtors had to say, so I thought I'd stand up and repeat some of this.

Two points, your Honor: One, the debtors don't dispute that they have this obligation, and also if required

We do believe, however, that as of today, we do not have the authority to make those payments without authority from this Court.

to do so today, we do have current assets to satisfy those

As was said, the ordinary course motion was denied. That order, we should not rely on that order.

As to the wage motion, it does not -- was never intent and does not expressly include what's being sought today.

Really, it's a matter of timing, and, obviously, the debtors are very concerned about morale of their current employees. If there was a demonstration that this sort of thing would impact morale of current employees and led current employees to believe that their indemnification rights may, for some reason, be threatened by what goes on here today, we would be inclined to support this motion.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, just briefly, as I

said, I think the debtor does, in fact, support this motion.

The debtor acknowledges its obligation under the contract and the by-laws, and with regard to Mr. Lockwood's statement, this petition was only filed in 2001.

There is a lot of time left on statute of limitations for things that preceded that. That it could, in fact, be prepetition claims as he would have you believe. That would, indeed, impact current management, current officers, who are entitled to indemnification.

This Court, as it does in every filing, always hears from debtors' counsel how it is important to employ and retain executives, how difficult that is. It often asks for special compensation packages.

I would suggest to you, your Honor, that a showing of necessity has been made. It is important to this debtor, as debtors' counsel has just acknowledged, that it is able to retain its executives, that that would be jeopardized, and there is a financial or economic impact, all of the retention efforts to date would be wasted.

This is something that I am sure the Court is aware is significant to officers and directors. They're very mindful of the fact that they could be named as individual defendants in matters that, for which they would rely, as these four people relied in good faith on their right to indemnification.

And it would impact this debtor. It would impact 1 their ability to retain these executives, and that would 2 obviously have economic impact on this debtor. 3 And beyond a doubt, this Court has economic --4 5 excuse me -- has equitable power to grant the relief 6 requested, and I would request that you exercise that power 7 and do so. 8 THE COURT: All right. Having heard 9 the arguments, I've decided I'm going to deny the motion. 10 I don't think the application falls within the narrowness doctrine, and I don't see why these employees 11 12 should be treated differently than other creditors, but I do 13 hope that the statement is correct, that all the unsecured 14 creditors will get paid a hundred cents on the dollar, and 15 that these employees will get paid on their indemnification claim as promptly as they can be paid. 16 17 All right. Is there anything else to take care of? 18 19 MR. PHILLIPS: Nothing, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Good. Court is in recess. 21 (Court recessed at 4:55 p.m.) 22 23

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I hereby certify that the foregoing is a transcript from my standard round and accurate transcript from my standard round notes in the proceeding.

Outlies Court Reporter

Outlies Court Certifier

U.S. District Court